

**CAUSE NO. PD-0967-17**

IN THE  
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS  
AUSTIN, TEXAS

FILED  
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS  
12/17/2018  
DEANA WILLIAMSON, CLERK

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**PETER ANTHONY TRAYLOR**  
APPELLANT/RESPONDENT  
v.  
**THE STATE OF TEXAS**  
APPELLEE/PETITIONER

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**MOTION FOR REHEARING**

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**TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:**

Petitioner, Peter Anthony Traylor, Defendant in Cause No. 366-82274-2010, 366<sup>th</sup> Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas and Appellant before the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas at Corpus Christi-Edinburg, in Cause No. 13-13-00371-CR, respectfully presents to this Honorable Court his ***Motion for Rehearing*** pursuant to Rule 79.6 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

## **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**<sup>1</sup>

Appellant was arrested on September 14, 2010 for the offense of Burglary of a Habitation while Attempting to Commit Aggravated Assault or Committing Aggravated Assault, alleged to have occurred on or about the 9<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2010. (CR— 7, 19) On December 15, 2010 the Grand Jury of Collin County Texas returned a “True Bill” of Indictment against Appellant for the First Degree Felony offense of Burglary of a Habitation with Intent to Commit another Felony, specifically committing aggravated assault or attempting to commit aggravated assault. (CR—7-8, 19, 21) And, on June 26, 2012 the State filed *State’s Notice to Seek a Finding of a Deadly Weapon* alleging Appellant used or exhibited a bladed instrument during the

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<sup>1</sup>Index of Abbreviations: **CR**- Clerk’s Record in Cause Number 366-82774-2010; **RR1.1**- Volume 1 of Supplemental Reporter’s Record containing Master Index of First Jury Trial proceedings commencing 12/10/12; **RR1.2**- Volume 2 of Supplemental Reporter’s Record of First Jury Trial proceedings (12/10/12); **RR1.3**- Volume 3 of Supplemental Reporter’s Record of First Jury Trial proceedings (12/11/12); **RR1.4**- Volume 4 of Supplemental Reporter’s Record of First Jury Trial proceedings (12/12/12); **RR1.5**- Volume 5 of Supplemental Reporter’s Record of First Jury Trial proceedings (12/13/12); **RR2.1**- Volume 1 of Reporter’s Record containing Master Index of Second Jury Trial proceedings commencing 5/6/13; **RR2.2**- Volume 2 of Reporter’s Record of Second Jury Trial proceedings (5/6/13-*Voir Dire*); **RR2.3**- Volume 3 of Reporter’s Record of Second Jury Trial proceedings (5/7/13); **RR2.4**- Volume 4 of Reporter’s Record of Second Jury Trial proceedings (5/8/13); **RR2.5**- Volume 5 of Reporter’s Record of Second Jury Trial proceedings (5/9/13); **RR2.6**- Volume 6 of Reporter’s Record of Second Jury Trial proceedings (5/14/13); **RR2.7**- Volume 7 of Reporter’s Record of Second Jury Trial proceedings-State’s Exhibits (“SE”)#1-#27; Defense Exhibits (“DE”)#1-#2; **Note**: State’s Exhibits #1-#27 also admitted at First Jury Trial Proceedings commencing 12/10/12.

commission of the offense. (CR—185)

Appellant elected for a Jury to determine guilt/innocence and the Court to assess punishment in the event of a “Guilty” verdict; but on December 13, 2012 the Court discharged the Jury after granting the request of the State to declare a mistrial. (CR— 11-15, 203, 204-213; RR1.4: 7-9) For Appellant’s second Trial, Appellant again elected for a Jury to determine guilt/innocence and the Court to assess punishment in the event of a “Guilty” verdict. (CR—16-18, 238, 241) The Jury returned a verdict of “Guilty” beyond a reasonable doubt to the offense of Burglary of a Habitation while committing Aggravated Assault or Attempting to Commit Aggravated Assault, also finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant used or exhibited of a “deadly weapon” during the commission of the offense. (CR—16-18, 243-252, 254-259; RR2.5: 6-10) Following the punishment phase of the trial the Court sentenced Appellant to twenty (20) years in the Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. (CR— 16-18, 254-260, 272-274; RR2.6— 187-190) On May 28, 2013 Appellant timely filed a ***Motion for New Trial*** and, on May 30, 2013, timely filed a ***Notice of Appeal***. (CR— 16-18, 261-264) On May 25, 2017 this Court sustained Appellant’s claim that his

subsequent trial and conviction for the first-degree felony offense of burglary violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and, therefore, reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on punishment for the second-degree felony offense of burglary only. This Court reversed the Judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the Judgment of the Trial Court.

### **STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS**

#### ***Relevant Facts related to Appellant's Claim of Double Jeopardy***

The Jury started to deliberate at 11:28 AM and, only thirty-seven (37) minutes later the Jury's First Note of Six Notes is received by the Court at 12:05 PM on December 12, 2012. (RR1.4: 53; CR: 214)

However, at or around 4:35 PM, the Trial Court reports the Jury has made a telephone call reporting they are deadlocked. (RR1.4: 64) By this time the Jury has submitted four (4) notes in writing, a dispute arose between at least two (2) jurors regarding very specific testimony related to the description of the scene of the offense which the Court Reporter read to the entire Jury in open Court, provided an oral report of being deadlocked via telephone, and only about five (5) hours had elapsed since deliberations had begun. (RR1.4: 54-64)

The following represents the entire recorded proceedings from telephone call by a juror reporting the jury being deadlocked until the Court's granting of a mistrial, at the request of the State and over the objection of the Appellant and subsequent and immediate request by Appellant for the Court to deliver an *Allen Charge*.

THE COURT: Back on the record in State versus Peter Traylor. We've received a phone call from the jury that indicates that they're deadlocked. They've been deliberating about four-and-a-half hours now. State have a request.

THE STATE: Request that they continue to deliberate.

THE COURT: Mr. Schultz?

MR. SCHULTZ: We wish a mistrial. Let me ask you this. Do they have any indication of the numerical split?

THE COURT: I wasn't told that. Mr. Chacon, did they indicate to you what the number was?

THE BAILIFF: No, sir.

THE COURT: They just—was it the Presiding Juror that called you? You don't know who it was? He just received a phone call from the jury that just said they're deadlocked.

MR. SCHULTZ: Perhaps I was a bit premature in my request. I'd like to withdraw it before you rule.

THE COURT: Yes, sir, you may withdraw it.

MR. SCHULTZ: Yes.

MR. SCHULTZ: Do you propose just to tell them to continue and not anything else? Would that be what you would do?

THE COURT: Is either side requesting an Allen Charge?

THE STATE: I would like an Allen Charge, Judge.

THE COURT: Do you oppose that request??

MR. SCHULTZ: Only—only it doesn't seem like it's been quite that long for something that drastic. But, I mean, it—it doesn't matter. I think that's the only ever issue on a Dynamite Charge, is length of time they've been deliberating. It's been a short trial. I'll say that.

THE COURT: It has been, considering that we didn't start testimony until Tuesday morning. So we had two—one full day of testimony Tuesday. Today is Wednesday.

MR. SCHULTZ: Would you be willing to inquire of their numerical split? Without regard to which way, would you be—would you consider that?

THE COURT: Does that State oppose that request?

THE STATE: For the time being, I do, Judge.

THE COURT: Well, one alternative is to let—to end the day and have the jury come back in the morning and resume deliberations in Maybe a break in deliberations and going home for the evening and coming back in the morning might result in a verdict. We can—our options are to let them work a reasonable time. I was planning on letting them work until 6:00, but they've indicated that they're deadlocked.

The other option would be to discharge them, let them come back in the morning and resume deliberations to see if that would result in a verdict.

Do you have any objections to that, State?

THE STATE: No, Your Honor.

MR. SCHULTZ: I wish you'd work them, a little longer beforehand, before you do that—

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SCHULTZ: --and just have them continue. And I don't know that—I mean, if we're thinking—I guess I don't see the harm in requesting, tell me how your—your vote is, without telling me which way it is. I don't—I do not know that there's a hammer. That might—that might give us some information on—like, let's say it's 11 to 1.

THE COURT: Well, its going to give one side or another an upper hand in terms of what's requested after that. For example, if you know that it's close to not guilty, you'll want them to continue deliberating.

MR. SCHULTZ: I don't want to ask them which way you're voting, not guilty or guilty. I'm not suggesting that. I'd just like to know, are we fighting an 11 to 1, or is it 6-6, or 5, 5—

THE COURT: Do you oppose that request?

THE STATE: Judge, that's fine.

THE COURT: All right. I'll send them a note and ask, without divulging the guilt or innocence, to tell me the numerical number of the jurors' votes, okay?

THE COURT: Well, we have a problem because they have to include the lesser included, so they're—right now, we're assuming that we're talking about just the first question, whether he's guilty or not of the aggravated assault.

MR. SCHULTZ: You're right.

THE COURT: And we don't know which of those two questions they may—I mean, there are two different issues that they'd have to answer. They'd have to tell us if they've moved on past the first question and they're hung up on the second question, or if they're hung up on the second question.

MR. SCHULTZ: You're right.

THE COURT: So how do we poll them about that? You want to ask them specifically which question that they're stuck on and what the numerical value of the vote is for that question?

MR. SCHULTZ: I'm not suggesting that kind of invasion, really. I don't know.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let's just let them answer generally, then what their vote is.

THE COURT: All right. I've entitled this, Court's Inquiry. Members of the Jury, the Court has been advised that the jury is deadlocked in its deliberations. Without indicating whether your vote is guilty or not guilty, please indicate, in the spaces provided below, the number of jurors voting one way or the other on the guilt or innocence questions. And I have blank, and then I have a slash and then another blank next to it. Would that—is the State opposed to that?

THE STATE: No, it's fine, Judge.

THE COURT: Are you opposed to that?

MR. SCHULTZ: No, sir.



THE COURT: Does that comply with your request. All right. Thank you.

(4:49 resume deliberations) (Jury note at 5:01)

THE COURT: Well, back on the record in State versus Peter Traylor. Contrary to the Court's specific instructions to the jury, the jury has indicated the number of people voting guilty and the number of people voting not guilty on both the primary charge and the lesser included charge. So the Court and the Bailiff, if he reviewed the note, are both aware of the jury's vote at this time on those issues. So does either side wish to know where the vote is at this time? Is the State requesting that information?  
(CR—218; Jury Response to Court's Inquiry)

THE STATE: No, Judge.

THE COURT: All right, Mr. Schultz, are you requesting that information?

MR. SCHULTZ: Well, it's awkward. Sure, I'm interested in—in what they've got to say.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I requested the information specifically about the number for and the number against. And so they're on the lesser included offense, and the vote is 5-7. That's where we are.

MR. SCHULTZ: The vote is—

THE COURT: 5 to 7. I'm—you requested—both sides requested not to know whether it was for guilty or innocent. And so they're on the lesser included offense, and the vote currently stands at 5 to 7. So the Court's going to instruct the jury to continue their deliberations. Are you still requesting the Allen Charge, State? It's 5:00 now. The jury's been deliberating since about noon, so they've been deliberating for about five hours, excluding the time they went to lunch.

THE STATE: No, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Schultz?

MR. SCHULTZ: No, sir.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SCHULTZ: Certainly not at this time. Something may change the next time we visit that issue.

THE COURT: Would the State be opposed to advising the jury, the Court is requesting that they continue their deliberations until 6:00 PM today, and if they're unable to reach a verdict, that we'll come back in the morning?

THE STATE: I'm fine with that, Judge.

MR. SCHULTZ: That's okay.

THE COURT: All right.

(Jury resumes deliberations at 5:05)

THE COURT: The supplemental instruction says, Members of the Jury, the Court has been advised that the jury is deadlocked in its deliberations. Please continue your deliberations until 6:00 PM today. If you are unable to reach a verdict by that time, the jury will return at 9:00 AM tomorrow to resume deliberations. Any objection?

MR. SCHULTZ: No, sir. That's better than an Allen Charge, if you ask me.

THE COURT: All right. You can take—well, they were in here when I discussed it, so you can go ahead and take it back.  
(Resume deliberations)

THE COURT: Let's bring the panel in, please.

THE BAILIFF: All rise.

(Jury seated.)

THE COURT: You may be seated, ladies and gentlemen. Ladies and gentlemen, I know you've been working very diligently on this case. You've been back there for a long time considering all the evidence very carefully. Your notes and your communication with the Court indicate that you're really reviewing this case as you should be. It's now a little bit after 6:00. We're going to go ahead and break for the evening and have you come back at 9:00 AM...Tomorrow morning, when you come back at 9:00 AM, you go straight back in the jury room. When you're all there, then you can resume your deliberations. So you are excused, We'll see you back tomorrow morning at 9:00 AM. We'll be in recess until then. (RR1.4—64-74)

The “*Court’s Inquiry Concerning the Jury’s Vote*” was the response to the telephone call by the anonymous juror reporting the Jury was deadlocked. (CR: 218) To be clear, and what was in direct contradiction to what the Court requested, the Court, Counsel for State and Counsel for Appellant were apprised of three things (explicitly and implicitly): (1) All twelve (12) juror had decided Appellant was “Not Guilty” of the offense as Charged in the Indictment—Appellant had been acquitted of the offense of Burglary of a Habitation while Attempting to Commit or Committing Aggravated Assault; (2) All twelve (12) jurors did not believe the allegation regarding the use/exhibition of a “deadly weapon”; and (3) Five (5) jurors believed Appellant

was “Guilty” of the lesser-included charge, while seven (7) jurors believed Appellant was even “Not Guilty” of the lesser-included charge. (CR: 218)

The following day the Jury re-commenced deliberations at 9:00 AM. (RR1.5—4) At 11:30 AM, the Court received the sixth (6) and final note from the Jury. In part, Note #6 stated: “*Judge, The Jurors are at an impasse with 2 Jurors for “not guilty” and 2 Jurors for “guilty” who have stated they will not (underline in original) change their position....The vote overall at this time is: 8 “Not Guilty” and 4 “Guilty.”*”

The following is the final exchange between the Court, Counsel for State, Counsels for Appellant at Trial, and the Jury:

MR. SCHULTZ: How is the Court inclined to deal with this, Judge?

THE COURT: Grant a mistrial, come back and start all over another day and another time.

MR. SCHULTZ: When we go on the record, we’ll probably be objecting to the mistrial and requesting a dynamite charge.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead and bring the jury in, please.

THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I know you’ve been working very hard on this case, and I’ve worked you a lot longer and harder than probably you thought I should have. But I was hoping that you could reach a verdict. I understand this is a difficult case. The issues in this case have not been easy. I received your note last night indicating that the jury did not believe that Mr. Traylor was guilty of the main charge of the offense, but that there was disagreement amongst jurors in the lesser included offense

and that you were hung up on that issue and that the vote apparently changed by only one juror from last night into today, even after deliberating for almost three hours today. So the note that I received, Ms. Topping—excuse me—is that the jury is hopelessly deadlocked; is that correct?

PRES. JUROR: I used the word impasse, but I suppose deadlock is probably the legal term. But we are at a point where we have 4 stated emphatically that they won't change their position.

**Applicable Law and Standard of Review/Double Jeopardy**

When Texas Appellate Courts decide cases involving the United States constitution, the Texas Appellate Courts are bound by the United States Supreme Court case law interpreting it. *See, e.g., Samudio v. State*, 648 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). If the Texas case law is in conflict, Texas Appellate Courts are obligated to follow United States Supreme Court federal constitutional precedents. *See* United States Constitution, Article VI. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that where one of its decisions on a federal constitutional issue directly conflicts with a United States Supreme Court holding, Texas Courts of Appeal and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals are bound to overrule its decision(s). *Samudio* at 314; *State v. Guzman*, 959 S.W.2d 631 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).

The Double Jeopardy Clause commands that “No person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” *See* U.S.

CONST.AMEND. V. The Clause prohibits the State from repeatedly attempting to convict a Defendant of an offense, thereby “subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. *Blueford v. Arkansas*, 566 U.S. 599, 132 S.Ct. 2044, 2050, 182 L.Ed.2d 937 (2012). The Double Jeopardy Clause “unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an acquittal.” *Arizona v. Washington*, 434 U.S. 497, 503, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978); U.S. CONST. amend. V; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 14. To permit a second trial following an acquittal would grant to the State what the clause forbids: the proverbial “second bite at the apple.” *Burks v. United States*, 437 U.S. 1, 10, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (recognizing that the double jeopardy clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first trial).

To implement this rule, the Supreme Court has articulated two principles. First, an acquittal occurs if a jury’s decision, “whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” *United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.*, 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977) To help ascertain whether an

acquittal has occurred, the form of the fact-finder's resolution "is not to be exalted over [its] substance"; at the same time, however, the form of the fact-finder's resolution cannot be "entirely ignored." *Sanabria v. United States*, 437 U.S. 54, 66, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978). Rather, the Court asks whether the fact-finder has made "a substantive determination that the prosecution has failed to carry its burden." *Smith v. Massachusetts*, 543 U.S. 462, 468 125 S.Ct. 1129, 160 L.Ed.2d 914 (2005). Jurisdictions have different procedures respecting the announcement of verdicts and the entry of judgments, but that diversity has no constitutional significance. Jeopardy terminates upon a determination, however characterized, that the "evidence is insufficient" to prove a defendant's "factual guilt." *Smalis v. Pennsylvania*, 476 U.S. 140, 144, 106 S.Ct. 1745, 90 L.Ed.2d 116 (1986). Thus, the Court has treated as acquittals a trial judge's directed verdict of not guilty, *Smith*, 543 U.S., at 468, 125 S.Ct. 1129; an appellate reversal of conviction for insufficiency of the evidence, *Burks*, 437 U.S. at 10, 98 S.Ct. 2141; and, most pertinent here, a jury's announcement of a not guilty verdict that was "not followed by any judgment," *United States v. Ball*, 163 U.S. 662, 671, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896). Second, a trial judge may not defeat a defendant's entitlement to "the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate" by declaring a

mistrial before deliberations end, absent a defendant's consent or a "manifest necessity" to do so. *United States v. Jorn*, 400 U.S. 470, 486, 481, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971)(plurality opinion).

Texas law clearly recognizes the existence of an informal verdict of acquittal.<sup>2</sup> See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 37.01 & 37.10 (a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). Article 37.01 provides: "Verdict" is defined as a "written declaration by a jury of its decision of the issue submitted

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<sup>2</sup> Here, the Trial Judge instructed the **Traylor** jury to consider the offenses in order, from the charged offense of first-degree felony Burglary to the second-degree felony Burglary, specifically: "*Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 9<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2010, in Collin County, Texas, the Defendant, Peter Anthony Traylor, did then and there intentionally or knowingly, enter a habitation, without the effective consent of Alicia Carter, the owner thereof, and attempted to commit or committed an aggravated assault against Alicia Carter, then you will find the Defendant guilty as charged in the indictment. Unless you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, of if you have a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty of Burglary of a Habitation and Attempting to or Committing Aggravated Assault as Charged, or if you cannot agree, you will next consider whether he is guilty of the lesser-included offense of Burglary of a Habitation and Attempting to or Committing Assault as instructed below.*" (CR: 206-207) Moreover, the State's closing arguments repeated this same directive: "*Now, you have sort of a stair-step of charges that you could possibly consider in this case...Now, the first Charge then on you verdict form, did he commit burglary of a habitation...commit or attempt to commit aggravated assault...[t]hat's the first thing. The second thing to consider, **if you can't agree on that beyond a reasonable doubt unanimously**, is to go to the next Charge...a lesser included charge of burglary...attempting to or committing...assault.* (RR1.4: 26-27)



to it in the case.” Article 37.10(a) provides that a trial court “shall” render judgment in accord with the jury’s verdict if the verdict is informal and it “manifestly appear[s]” that the jury intended to acquit the Defendant.

### **Discussion**

In *Blueford*, after a few hours of deliberation, the jury foreperson reported that all twelve jurors were unanimous against guilt on the charged offense but that they were deadlocked on the lesser-included offense. *Blueford*, 566 U.S., at \_\_\_\_, 132 S.Ct. at 2049. The trial court told the jury to deliberate. *Id.* When the jury returned a half hour later, the foreperson stated that they had not reached a verdict. *Id.* The foreperson did not state as to which offense they had not reached a verdict. *Id.* The court declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. *Id.* Although the jury never reached a formal verdict prior to being discharged, the defendant argued that the foreperson’s report that all twelve jurors were unanimous against guilt on the charged offense amounted to an acquittal on that offense, which barred a second prosecution. *Id.* at 2050.

The United States Supreme Court disagreed, because the foreperson’s report “lacked the finality necessary” to amount to an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. *Id.* The Court relied on the following: (1) deliberations resumed after the report, thereby making it at least possible that some jurors

reconsidered the defendant's guilt on the charged offense; (2) nothing in the jury charge prohibited the jurors from reconsidering their votes on the charged offense; and (3) at the conclusion of deliberation, the foreperson stated only that the jury was "unable to reach a verdict" but gave no indication whether it was still the case that all twelve jurors were unanimous against guilt on the charged offense. *Id.* at 2050-51. However, by addressing and rejecting the defendant's argument, the Court recognized in *Blueford* that, even short of a formal verdict of acquittal, a jury's post-deliberation communication may, in an appropriate case, contain the finality necessary to amount to an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. *Id.*

Here, like in *Blueford*, the foreperson reported that all twelve jurors were unanimous against guilt on the charged offense but that they were deadlocked seven/five against guilt on the lesser-included offense. Also like in *Blueford*, the jury resumed deliberations after the foreperson's report, and nothing in the jury charge prohibited the jurors from reconsidering their votes on the charged offense during that time. If the record in this case contained only the foreperson's initial report, we could confidently say, as did the *Blueford* Court, that it was at least possible that some jurors might have reconsidered Appellant's guilt as to the charged offense after continued deliberations. However, we

cannot confidently entertain that possibility based on what transpired after jury deliberation concluded. Unlike in *Blueford*, the record in this case shows that, at the end of jury deliberation, the foreperson reported that the jurors were now deadlocked eight/four against guilt, which prompted the following colloquy between the trial court and foreperson:

THE COURT: I received your note last night indicating that the jury did not believe that Mr. Traylor was guilty of the main charge of the offense, but that there was disagreement amongst jurors in the lesser included offense and that you were hung up on that issue and that the vote apparently changed by only one juror from last night into today, even after deliberating for almost three hours today. So the note that I received, Ms. Topping—excuse me—is that the jury is hopelessly deadlocked; is that correct?

PRES. JUROR: I used the word impasse, but I suppose deadlock is probably the legal term.

As the trial court's comments demonstrate, prior to the end of deliberation, the jury remained unanimous against guilt on the charged offense but deadlocked seven/five against guilt on the lesser-included offense; however, by the end of deliberation, only one juror's vote had changed from guilty to not guilty on the lesser-included offense, making the final vote eight/four against guilt on the lesser-included offense. The foreperson then confirmed that there was an impasse or deadlock in response to the trial court's question, as framed. The foreperson's post-deliberation report of an eight/four deadlock against

guilt, combined with her post-deliberation answer to the trial court concerning that deadlock, established that all twelve jurors remained unanimous against guilt on the charged offense and foreclosed any reasonable speculation that the deadlock related to the charged offense rather than the lesser-included offense. *Cf. id.* (noting that the post-deliberation record was silent regarding whether the jurors still believed that the defendant was not guilty of the charged offense). Thus, the post-deliberation record in this case shows what the record in *Blueford* did not: a final resolution *plainly intended* to indicate Appellant was not guilty of the charged offense of first-degree burglary. Unlike *Blueford*, the jury's communication contained the finality necessary to amount to an acquittal on the first-degree burglary for double jeopardy purposes; the trial court clearly and plainly understood that to be the jury's verdict, and neither the State nor Appellant, at trial or on appeal, disputed this fact.

Why *Traylor* is unlike *Blueford* to the extent that where the United States Supreme Court determined the jury foreperson's report "lacked the finality necessary" to amount to an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes in *Blueford*, it would and ought not to find the same in *Traylor*.

1. Five hours of deliberation and four (4) notes before the *Traylor* jury reported orally and in writing it was 12 Not-Guilty for the charged offense

but 7 Innocent-5 Guilty on the lesser-included offense ; around two (2) hours of deliberation and one (1) note before the *Blueford* jury reported in writing it was deadlocked on the lesser-included offense.

2. Despite the specific written instruction of the Trial Judge to indicate the number of jurors voting one way or the other on the guilt/innocence questions without indicating whether the vote was guilty or not guilty as it applied to the jury being deadlocked in its deliberations, the *Traylor* jury elected to reveal the unanimous verdict of all twelve (12) jurors as it pertained to the offense as charged in the Indictment, the charge on which it was NOT deadlocked at all.

3. The *Traylor* jury reported its unanimous verdict of 12 Not- Guilty for charged offense in writing, signed by the Foreperson of the Jury; the *Blueford* jury merely reported orally that a unanimous verdict of Not-Guilty had been reached on the charged offense, but no signature of any juror.

4. Despite the specific written instructions of the Trial Judge to NOT indicate whether the vote is guilty or not guilty, the *Traylor* jury reported to what extent and on what Charge is was deadlocked: 5 Guilty/ 7 Innocence on the Lesser-Included Charge.

5. The Trial Court Judge ordered the *Traylor* Jury to deliberate for an additional hour and, if the Jury remained deadlocked on the lesser-included charge, the Jury would be required to re-appear the next morning at 9:00 AM; the *Blueford* jury deliberated a mere 30 minutes longer after its one and only report to the Trial Court, with no additional discussion between the Court and members of the Jury before the mistrial was granted.

6. The *Traylor* Jury re-appeared the next morning and continued deliberations for nearly three (3) more hours. At this time the Trial Court Judge acknowledged to the Jury Foreperson that while the Court recognized the Jury continued to believe the Defendant was not guilty of the offense as charged in the Indictment (first-degree felony burglary) it appeared the vote of 7 not guilty/5 guilty had changed to 8 not guilty/4 guilty in that nearly three (3) hourly period, to which the Jury Foreperson confirmed.

7. After five (5) hours of deliberation which included the following initial statement written by the Jury Foreperson—“Charged in the Indictment- 12 Not Guilty”—to be later confirmed after four (4) more hours of deliberation by the words of the Jury Foreperson to continue to be 12 Not Guilty for Offense as charged in the Indictment, but 8 Not Guilty/4 Guilty for the Lesser-Included Offense. Nine (9) hours of deliberations over two days in *Traylor*, including six

notes and reports in writing and orally that the jury was unanimous against guilt on the charged offense but deadlocked on the lesser-included offense—with multiple instances where any one of the jurors had the opportunity to clarify or contradict the oral reports provided by the Foreperson; around three (3) hours of deliberations in one day in *Blueford*, including just one note and only one oral report the jury was unanimous against guilt on the charged offense but deadlocked on the lesser-included offense.

8. In *Traylor* the mistrial was granted over the objection of the Defendant; *Blueford*, a mistrial was granted without any objection by the Defendant.

9. Unlike in *Blueford*, the Jury Foreperson’s final written and oral report in *Traylor* to the Trial Court Judge contained the “finality necessary” to satisfy the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause as it pertained to the first-degree felony Burglary charge.

### **CONCLUSION**

**WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED**, Appellant prays this court grant Appellant’s *Motion for Rehearing*.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Marc Joseph Fratter

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Attorney for Appellant

### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on the 15<sup>th</sup> day of December, 2018 a true copy of the foregoing Appellant's ***Motion for Rehearing*** has been served on the District Attorney of Collin County, Appellate Division at 2100 Bloomdale Road, Suite 100, McKinney, Texas 75071 to: [daappeals@co.collin.tx.us](mailto:daappeals@co.collin.tx.us) and on the State of Texas, Prosecuting Attorney, Stacey Soule, at 209 West 14<sup>th</sup> Street, P.O. Box 13046, Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711, by United States certified priority mail, return receipt requested

/s/ Marc Joseph Fratter

Marc J. Fratter



## **CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE**

Pursuant to Rules 9.4(i)(3) and 9.4(i)(2)(D) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure the undersigned counsel certifies that the total word count of the *Appellant's Reply to the State's Motion for Rehearing* filed in the above-referenced cause according to the Microsoft Word program is **4,465**.

/s/Marc Joseph Fratter

Marc J. Fratter